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ABSTRACT

This research-in-progress note reports on the design and
execution of a study in HCI-based deception detection.
The objective of the study is to examine the impact of
knowledge of tracking and countermeasures on the neuromotor changes detected when subjects commit a
malfeasant act. To examine this, an experimental context
and design was required that would afford the subjects an
opportunity to commit an un-sanctioned malicious act
while tracking ground truth in an unobtrusive manner.
The experimental design, study execution, and
preliminary results are presented.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION 1

Deception and malfeasance are endemic in our world
today. Crime and terror threats are never far from top of
mind and the enhanced security measures put in place in
reaction impact us all on almost a daily basis. Above and
beyond questions of law enforcement, safety, and
security, the economic costs of malfeasance can be
staggering. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
estimates that in 2018 the typical organization loses 5% of
their revenues to fraud (ACFE 2018) and the insurance
industry alone is estimated to have lost over $80 billion in
2015 (Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 2015).
Individual instances can be much more spectacular and
1
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expensive (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) and can
systematically
infiltrate
and
undermine
entire
organizations such as Wells Fargo with their fake
accounts scandal (Conti-Brown 2017). In addition, insider
threats have become one of the most critical threats facing
government agencies and corporations (Gorman 2014).
To address these threats, new approaches to screening are
needed. As information technology has revolutionized the
conduct of business operations, it is now poised to
dramatically alter security and screening processes.
Specifically, research into the use of information systems
for deception detection has grown substantially in scope
in recent years (Nunamaker Jr et al. 2016). Systems that
utilize technologies such as eye tracking (Proudfoot et al.
2016), facial recognition (Su and Levine 2016), and
linguistic analysis (Burgoon et al. 2016) are increasingly
being tested and deployed from the lab into real world
usage. Previous work has indicated that such deviant
behaviors can also be detected using commonly available
human-computer interaction (HCI) devices such as
computer mice (Hibbeln et al. 2014, 2017). When an
individual engages in a deviant behavior there are
multiple impacts on their cognitive processes. These
impacts manifest as changes in the motor nervous system.
These changes are detectable by analyzing movement
information collected from HCI devices. The use of
commonly available HCI devices offers options for
deployment of such behavioral monitoring systems at
scale. Expensive eye-tracking hardware or special
cameras are not required – merely software that captures
and analyzes the appropriate data from the HCI device.
Systems that flag such HCI behaviors are being
commercialized and evaluated for use in multiple
contexts. These systems work by generating a baseline of
a user's movements while they are engaged in innocuous
activity and comparing that baseline to their movements
when they answer questions relevant to the risky
behavior. These systems are being deployed in
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commercial contexts, such as loan underwriting, and
national security contexts, such as insider threat detection.

indicators (i.e., maximum deviation, normalized areaunder-the-curve, and normalized additional distance).

When deploying such a system in practice, a common
concern that arises is that of countermeasures. We define
countermeasures in this context to mean the use of
movement techniques designed to defeat the ability of a
mouse movement tracking system to infer valid results. In
other words, what happens when users know that they are
being monitored and attempt to defeat the system? To
address this question, we conducted an experiment in
which we gave subjects the opportunity to choose to
perform a malfeasant act (i.e., cheating) in a context in
which we could know ground truth without overly
intrusive monitoring. This preliminary report focuses on
the context and experimental design to achieve these
objectives.

Task

BACKGROUND

This research is an extension of previous work in HCIbased detection of cognitive states and deception (Hibbeln
et al. 2017; Jenkins et al. 2019). As in these previous
studies, we leverage Attentional Control Theory (ACT)
and the Response Activation Model (RAM) to connect
these cognitive and emotional effects to motor-nervous
system phenomena that are measurable using HCI
devices. ACT states that experiencing negative emotions
leads one's attention to shift from being goal directed to
being stimulus driven (Eysenck et al. 2007). As a result,
additional cognitive resources are consumed, leading to a
degradation of motor performance (see Hibbeln et al.
2017). RAM states that as possible movement choices are
entered into working memory, the motor-nervous system
pre-plans destinations and sub-movements. This preplanning shows up as increased changes to the actual
trajectories taken in response to questions about malicious
acts (i.e., less movement accuracy). Thus, we would
expect to see similar changes to motor nervous system
metrics as in the previous work (e.g., greater deviation
and distance for cheaters than for non-cheaters). For this
study, our research questions was how these effects
change as additional information is provided to subjects
about the fact that they are being tracked, the nature of the
tracking, and potential countermeasures to the system.
METHOD

The system we used to track movements is derived from a
commercial system. A small JavaScript is embedded in
web pages containing the questions to which the user
responds. Our system collects the same raw data as the
commercial system – XY coordinates and timestamps.
The raw data is then uploaded to a cloud-hosted analysis
engine. The commercial system uses the raw data to
generate an extensive set of features, analyzes them, and
then generates results using proprietary algorithms. For
this analysis, we restrict the features to a limited set of

Next, a task was needed in which the user could decide to
commit a deviant act. It is important that the user be able
to choose whether or not to commit the act. Since the
detection system relies on cognitive and emotional
responses to generate the changes in the motor nervous
system, it is crucial that the deviant act not be sanctioned
by the experimenters. If the act is sanctioned, the subjects
will not have the underlying psychological and
physiological responses to having performed something
deviant – they will "know" that what they did was
authorized. This requirement makes it a challenge to
design an experimental task. The subject must be left free
to decide whether or not to perform the deviant act. This
also increases required sample sizes since subjects who do
not decide to perform the deviant act above and beyond
those needed for a statistically valid comparison group are
effectively wasted.
To encourage participants to perform the deviant act, the
nature of the task needs to be something they feel they
can "get away with." By obfuscating the participants'
activity, they are given a sense of freedom to perform an
act that they might otherwise not perform due to social or
legal pressure. The realities of performing experimental
research using human subjects restricts the types of
deviant acts available. We needed one that would be
sufficiently frowned upon to evoke the desired cognitive
and emotional responses, yet not so far gone as to do
lasting psychological damage from having committed it.
We chose to create a simulated intelligence test. This test
consisted of multiple choice and fill-in-the-blank
questions. This instrument is appropriate as there are
many of these types of tests available online and the
outcomes are of interest to participants without directly
leading to potential tangible harms.
To properly analyze the outcomes of the experiment
sessions, we must know the ground truth – did the
participant cheat or not? If the decision as to whether to
perform the deviant act is left up to the subject and the
task is designed to allow suitable expectation that they
will not be immediately caught and sanctioned for such
performance another challenge arises – knowing if they
actually performed the act. If it is obvious to the
participant that their actions will be detected, they may
not decide to perform the deviant act. We could have
attempted to create additional software that would detect
if a user visited a different web page. Alternatively, we
could have attempted to generate cookies or another
tracking mechanism that would have allowed us to
correlate visits to our cheating websites. Neither of these
approaches were satisfactory given the variety of
mechanisms a user could have used to cheat. For
example, a user filling out the intelligence test on a

Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Pre-ICIS Workshop on HCI Research in MIS, San Francisco, CA, December 13, 2018
2

Byrd et. al.

desktop or laptop could have searched for the answers
using their smartphone. In other words, attempting to
track the process or mechanism by which they cheated
would be a losing battle. In order to be as certain as
possible that the user cheated, we needed the actual
outcome of the interaction to be useful to determine if
they cheated. To do this, we created the fake intelligence
test in such a way that the only way to achieve a top score
would be to cheat.
To accomplish this, we designed the test with easy, hard,
and impossible questions. Easy questions are questions
that anyone should be able to answer; e.g., what is 2+2?
Hard questions are questions that it is not likely that
someone would know, but ultimately possible to know;
e.g., obscure facts. Impossible questions are questions that
it is not possible for someone to know the answer unless
they cheat; e.g., made up facts (e.g., "Dr. Jeffrey Zaverik
is noted for the discover of which of the following?"). We
then created websites containing the answers to all types
of questions and posted them online. We performed
Search Engine Optimization (SEO) 2 to help insure the
sites would be easy to find with a Google or Bing search.
Two websites were created: one was designed to look like
the vendor of the test had placed sample questions online
(Figure 1); the second was designed to look like a third
party was sharing the answers. These two types of sites
were selected as they exhibit face validity – i.e., it is
reasonable that they would exist and have the answers
posted.

Creating a Realistic Experimental Scenario for Deception Detection
Figure 1: Cheating Website

Since there was no way a participant could know the
answers to the impossible questions, if they got them
correct they either guessed or cheated. We placed five
impossible questions on the test, four multiple-choice and
one fill in the blank. Each multiple-choice question had
five possible answers, thus the odds of guessing an
individual question are 1/5 = 20%. The fill-in-the-blank
question asked for a single letter (The most used letter in
the Nekmunnit language is translated to which letter in
English?), thus the odds of guessing correctly are 1/26 =
3.85%. The combined probability of getting all five
correct by guessing is 1/16,250. For a participant to guess
three of the four multiple choice questions and the fill-inthe-blank question correctly, the odds are 1/3,250. We
anticipated using on the order of 750 participants (50 per
cell * 5 conditions / 33% estimated cheat rate = 750), thus
we felt it appropriate to deem anyone having answered
three or four of the multiple choice and the single fill-inthe-blank question correct as having cheated. After further
pilot testing we dropped the hard category since it did not
contribute anything to the cheating calculation and just
made the test longer. We also stopped randomly selecting
questions from a pool. We did this in order to more easily
be able to score the questionnaires in real time to assign
subject payments. In addition, we judged the additional
control we gained from being able to tweak the questions
outweighed any risk of order effects.
Measurement

Following the fake IQ test questions, we first asked the
participants a series of demographic questions (such as
gender and world region). These questions serve to collect
demographic information to use in the subsequent
baseline questions. We then asked the participants to
confirm their demographic information with a series of
Yes/No questions. These questions serve to calculate the
baseline movement information as there is no reason to
expect that someone would be deceptive about confirming
information that they just provided. Next, we asked the
participants the risk relevant questions (i.e., "I cheated on
the intelligence test", "I looked up answers while
completing the test"). We asked about cheating in
multiple ways since our early pilots indicated that
different individuals may have different interpretations of
what it means to cheat.
Manipulation

The SEO process led us to iteratively revise our questions. For
example, we originally had a question: "Dr. Jeffery Smith is noted for
the discovery of which of the following?" We ultimately changed
"Smith" to the made up and unique name "Zaverik" such that it could
become a unique keyword for the search engine and be more likely to
return our sites.

2

In order to instantiate countermeasures in our context we
gave participants varying degrees of awareness of the
tracking. This manipulation was inserted immediately
before the participants were asked the demographic
questions described above. The control group (Group 0)
was given no knowledge that their mouse movements
were being tracked. The first condition (Group 1) was told
simply that they were being tracked:
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Please note: We capture your interaction data (e.g.,
mouse movements) and use this information in order to
identify those who are being deceptive when answering
these questions.
The second condition (Group 2) was given additional
details about what we were looking at:
Interaction data attributes that we monitor include:
• Behavioral indicators such as hesitation, switching
answers, skipping questions and returning, etc…
• Movement indicators such as click accuracy, deviations
from ideal trajectories, number of clicks, hesitations,
etc…
The third condition (Group 3) was shown all of the above
plus was shown images of what the monitored attributes
look like (e.g., Figure 3).
Trajectory Deviations

Answer Switching

Figure 3: Group 3 Manipulation (example)

The fourth condition (Group 4) was shown all of the
above, plus was shown images of what some potential
countermeasure strategies might look like (e.g., Figure 4).

Try to be super smooth and
consistent on all questions

Try to move constantly to
mask any changes

Valacich 2001). We initially followed the standard
practice of working with instructors to offer extra credit in
their classes to subjects for participation. This serves to
catch the attention of potential participants and motivate
them to sign up. Then, we planned to use variable pay to
incentivize the desired behavior (i.e., cheating on the test).
In our initial pilot tests, we had 15 questions on the test;
five easy, five hard, and five impossible. Subjects were
paid $5 to participate and then $1 per correct answer. The
idea was to motivate the participants to get as many
correct answers as possible to maximize their payment.
After piloting the experiment with these incentives, we
found that the rates of cheating were much lower than
anticipated (5-10%). We reviewed the responses
individually from the pilots and found that once
participants encountered a hard or impossible question,
they simply gave up. To get our cheating rates up to our
target range (25-30%) needed for adequate sample sizes,
we first upped the financial incentive. In the next pilot,
instead of giving $1 per correct answer, we gave a $15
bonus for correctly answering all of the questions (100%
correct). Our rates were still in the 5-10% range and the
pattern of answers was similar – i.e., participants
appeared to just give up.
We posit that the participants were being primarily
motivated by the extra credit they were receiving just for
participating and that this was overshadowing the
financial incentives. Monetary incentives will induce
effort if cognitive and motivation mechanisms are aligned
(e.g., expected utility, goals, self-efficacy) (Bonner and
Sprinkle 2002). The expected utility of cash is always
greater than no cash, however, misaligned goals can
overwhelm this effect (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). In our
case, the participant's goal was to gain extra credit in their
course and thus was misaligned with the monetary
incentive leading to lack of effort. To test this
explanation, we ran another pilot where we specifically
asked the instructors whose classes we recruited from to
not offer extra credit for participation. Our sign-up rates
were accordingly much lower, but the cheating rates went
up to 30-35% 3. Ultimately 282 subjects completed the
study – 347 participated, but 65 used mobile devices to
complete the survey so their data was not usable.

Figure 4: Group 4 Manipulation (example)
Subjects

Subjects were recruited from undergraduate and graduate
classes at a large public university in the southwest of the
United States. Students are a good choice for this work as
they are broadly similar to the population as a whole in
terms of their technology familiarity and propensity to
interact with online systems. In addition, they are good
subjects since they are relatively homogenous, facilitating
experimental control and internal validity (Dennis and

This explanation is further supported by the difficulty we had in getting
the initial batches of participants who received extra credit to come
collect their cash payments. University policy required that we collect
in-person signatures when providing payments and as such, the
participants had to come to our office to receive payment. In the pilots
with extra credit, multiple follow-up emails were required over the
course of many days to get the students to come get their money. When
they were only incentivized with monetary rewards, they appeared much
more eager to come get their cash. Interestingly, however, many students
under both reward mechanisms never did come get their money.
3
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PRELIMINARY RESULTS

In analyzing the 282 subjects, we found some interesting
trends in the preliminary results, however very little
attained statistical significance. To investigate, a power
analysis was performed to ascertain if the sample size was
sufficient for the effects. Since the total number of
subjects per cell is determined by the number needed to
get a certain number of cheaters in that cell at the
observed cheat rate, the power analysis was conducted on
the subset of the sample that cheated. An estimate of the
effect size for each metric on the pairwise t-tests for
cheaters were calculated by taking the average of each
pairwise mean difference and dividing by the pooled
standard deviation for that metric (Cohen 1988). The
mean overall effect size for cheaters was then calculated
by taking the average across each of the measures level
effect sizes (Cooper and Hedges 1993, p. 241). The
overall estimated effect size value that was arrived at was
0.35. This is about halfway between the estimates of
small (0.2) and medium (0.5) effect sizes for a t-test
statistic (Cohen 1988, 1992), which was taken as evidence
of face validity for the purposes of this power analysis.
The power for the tests on the data that were collected
was then calculated using the Cohen (1988) method and
this estimate of effect size, yielding a power of 0.29. This
indicates that the current experiment was substantially
underpowered (Cohen 1988, 1992). A generally accepted
value for sufficient power is 0.80 (Cohen 1992). To attain
this level of power with our estimated effect size, we
would need 102 cheaters per cell. Given our observed
cheat rate of approximately 30-35%, we would thus need
an overall sample size of approximately 300 per cell. A
follow-up study has been conducted using Mechanical
Turk in order to facilitate collecting so many subjects per
cell. 2,500 subjects were collected: 7 cells at 300 per cell,
plus a buffer to account for potential device filtering
issues (e.g., a laptop with a touchscreen). We are
currently analyzing this data.
CONCLUSION

This research in progress note reports on the design and
execution of a study in HCI-based detection deception.
The objective of the study was to examine the impact of
knowledge of tracking and countermeasures on the neuromotor changes detected when subject commit a
malfeasant act. To examine this, an experimental context
and design was required that would afford the subjects an
opportunity to commit an un-sanctioned malicious act
while tracking ground truth in an unobtrusive manner.
While the initial data collection did not yield much in the
way of significant results, the experimental context and
design was found to be robust and potentially useful for
others. Subsequent data collection has taken place and
results will be reported in the future.
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